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19 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive

SUBJECT:

Official Lectures

- 1. In keeping with the request of the Deputy Executive, I submit information pertinent to lectures which I have made at the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence at various institutions throughout the country.
- 2. I have always spoken from notes rather than read a prepared manuscript. On all such occasions, when representing the Director of Central Intelligence, I felt that in my audiences were individuals of high military rank or of stature in the civilian field, many of whom had vast experience in intelligence work predominantly in the Agencies we know as "IAC Agencies." Hence, they had rather firm convictions, very frequently not too sympathetic to the whole concept of a Central Intelligence Agency. Accordingly, I pled not for their sympathy, but for their recognition of the following facts:
  - a. That the Central Intelligence Agency is not merely another alphabetical accretion dumped into the bureaucratic maze of Washington.
  - b. That the Central Intelligence Agency does not supersede, minimize or duplicate the departmental intelligence agencies.
  - c. That a reciprocal relationship is essential in which the departmental intelligence agencies recognize the need for CIA and CIA in turn realizes that it cannot function without the departmental organizations.
  - d. That the functions and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency as enunciated in the National Security Act of 1917 are most difficult in their implementation because the coordination responsibility of the DCI extends into the activities and functions of organizations which are not under his direct chain of command.

The speaker has always attempted to present these thoughts in realistic manner, documented by specific examples, and has been most encouraged by collective audience reaction and individual expressions of opinion to the effect that previous antipathy toward the Central Intelligence Agency had been replaced not only by sympathy for our problems, but by

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enthusiastic support for what we are attempting to do. This type of response brings more than more lip loyalty to our endeavors, when we consider that many of the persons in the audiences are assigned to agency intelligence activities in Washington or in the field after their schooling period is completed.

The specific outline of my remarks on each occasion has been as follows:

### A. Background statement

- 1. To lay the proper ground work for an adequate presentation of the functions and responsibilities of CIA, it is essential to present in broad-brush manner the picture of the intelligence eituation in our nation prior to World War II when intelligence was considered a type of non-essential frivolity which was in large measure existing without the sympathetic support of operational officials.
- 2. During World War II, even though more recognition was given to the need for good intelligence, it remained an uncoordinated effort. After the war, the Mational Intelligence Authority, created by Executive Order, was the first unified effort to synthesize and coordinate intelligence.
- 3. A brief presentation is then given of the relationship between the Mational Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency.

### B. Functions of the Central Intelligence Agency

- l. After indicating in definite manner that the CIA always operates under the direction of the National Security Council, a short descriptive factual explanation is given to elaborate on each of the six functions of CIA as identified in the National Security Act, namely:
  - s. Advice to the National Security Council
  - b. Recommendations to the National Security Council
  - c. The collection and evaluation of intelligence and dissemination of the finished product
  - d. The responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods
  - e. The performance of services of common concern
  - f. The undertaking of special activities when directed to do so by the National Security Council
- C. Observations on particular aspects of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency
  - 1. A brief presentation is made of the two categories

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of directives: the National Security Council Intelligence Directives and the directives of the DCI.

2. The establishment of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and its performance.

Under this heading an effort is made to dissipate the impression harbored by some, that the existence of the IAC eliminates most of the problems confronting the DCI in the field of coordination. This they begin to comprehend when they understand some of our problems in obtaining concurrences to intelligence estimates.

- 3. A brief discussion is made on the problem of identifying national intelligence and departmental intelligence, recognizing that even though definitions have been written and accepted, their day-to-day application is extremely difficult.
- 4. I have striven to clarify the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency is the one intelligence organization in Washington which approximates the goal of complete objectivity, since we have no departmental bias or policy line.
- 5. At this stage of the discussion, the minds of the audiences are usually inclined to react with favor to a positive suggestion. This feeling is enhanced by the fact that the suggestion offered is one which happens to recognize a constant headache for the departmental intelligence agencies also. Accordingly, the plea is made that planning and operational persons recognize the fact that the intelligence organizations cannot do a complete job until they have access to all applicable information. Hence, weaknesses in intelligence estimates are too frequently directly attributable to a lack of proper information having been made available.
- 6. An effort has been made to firmly "lay the ghost" that CIA is an incipient Gestapo. This is enunciated by reference to the National Security Act itself, and is bolstered by the personal observation of those within the Agency.

#### D. Organization of CIA

This presentation has been broken down into three categories, viz., staff activities, operating offices and clandestine operations. A few words are said about each of the major undertakings in the several offices.

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#### E. Conclusion

In the conclusion the speaker attempts to summarize all thoughts into the framework enunciated at the beginnings that the problem of coordination in the intelligence field is no "bed of roses." In addition to asking for their patient support and consideration (not sympathy), the speaker has always attempted to conclude his remarks on a realistic basis, indicating that even though CIA is not yet a perfect organisation, it is certainly going in the right direction, and from a career standpoint, they should realize that good national intelligence is at last recognized as an inevitable adjunct to sound national policy. In this way, the field of intelligence is no longer just a tolerated appendage of temporary status, but rather a career undertaking which will grow in strength with the progression of time and the teamwork of CIA and the departmental intelligence chiefs.

3. Attached is a list of the presentations already made and those scheduled for the future.

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Coordination, Operations and Policy Staff

cc: Central Records